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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Sadly, religious liberty has become a matter of great 
controversy and division in our society. Although not so many years 
ago there was a nearly unanimous, bi-partisan consensus supporting 
the legal protection of religious liberty from laws substantially 
burdening the free exercise of religion,1 irreconcilable differences 
among us over contraception, abortion, sexuality, and the nature of 
marriage have made religious liberty a divisive partisan issue.2 
Although most religious liberty cases concern religious minorities 
whose religiously-motivated conduct has been disregarded “by an 
insensitive majority,”3 a handful of cases involving Christian-owned 
businesses and ministries claiming a religious liberty right to refuse 
to supply contraceptives and abortifacients to their students and 
employees or goods and services for same-sex marriages have led 
progressives to turn their backs on religious liberty.4 As Professor 
Laycock puts it, progressives “persist in demanding not only the 
right to live their own lives by their own values, but also the right to 
force religious objectors to assist them in doing so.”5 As a result, 
“[r]eligious liberty is at risk”6 wherever progressive elites are in 
power.  
Onto this desolate stage strode Jack Phillips, a wedding cake 
artist who deeply and reasonably believes “that ‘God’s intention for 
marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the 
union of one man and one woman.’”7 Phillips considers his wedding 
cakes artistic expression celebrating the beauty of marriage as God 
designed marriage.8 Each one of his wedding cakes is custom made. 
As Phillips’s attorneys explain: 
                                               
1  As Professor Douglas Laycock observes, “When Congress passed the federal 
RFRA in 1993, it acted unanimously in the House and 97–3 in the Senate.” 
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
839, 845. However, in a matter of only a few years, Congress went from nearly 
unanimous support for religious liberty “to partisan gridlock.” Id. at 846. 
2  Id. 
3  Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
353, 354, 400 (2018). 
4  See Laycock, supra note 1, at 846. 
5  Id. at 879–880. 
6  Id. at 880. 
7  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1724 (2018). 
8  See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-
111) [hereinafter “Petitioner’s Brief”]. 
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Much like an artist sketching on canvas or a sculptor 
using clay, Phillips meticulously crafts each wedding 
cake through hours of sketching, sculpting, and 
hand-painting. The cake, which serves as the iconic 
centerpiece of the marriage celebration, announces 
through Phillips’s voice that a marriage has occurred 
and should be celebrated.9 
Although Phillips is happy to serve all people without regard 
to race, religion, or sexual orientation,10 “he cannot design custom 
cakes that express ideas or celebrate events at odds with his religious 
beliefs.”11 Thus, Phillips will not design cakes celebrating 
Halloween or divorce, or those promoting hateful messages aimed 
at racial minorities or gays and lesbians.12 
In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, a same-sex 
couple, visited Phillips’s bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and 
“requested that Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their 
same-sex wedding.”13 Phillips informed the couple that based upon 
his sincerely held religious beliefs, he does not create custom 
wedding cakes celebrating same-sex marriages, but he also told 
them that “he would be happy to make and sell them any other baked 
goods.”14 In other words, Phillips was happy to serve LGBT 
customers in general, but he believed it would “displease God” if he 
were to create wedding cakes for same-sex marriages.15  
Although the same-sex couple was easily able to find 
another baker to create and bake a multi-tiered, rainbow-layered 
wedding cake—in fact, the other baker did not even charge the gay 
couple for the cake16—they filed a sexual orientation discrimination 
complaint against Phillips under Colorado’s public 
accommodations law. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruled 
                                               
9  Id. at 1–2. 
10  Id. at 8–9. 
11  Id. at 9. 
12  Id. 
13  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015), 
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Notice that the record in this case makes clear 
that Craig and Mullins requested a cake “celebrating” their marriage, one which 
was designed to recognize that their relationship was a marriage and was 
something to be celebrated. Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 277 (“Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art, that he can 
honor God through his artistic talents, and that he would displease God by 
creating cakes for same-sex marriages.”). 
16  Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 10. 
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that Phillips was guilty of sexual orientation discrimination and 
issued an order requiring Phillips to “cease and desist from 
discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them 
wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to heterosexual 
couples.”17 In other words, the order mandated that Phillips must 
create custom wedding cakes celebrating same-sex marriages if he 
creates cakes celebrating traditional marriages between one man and 
one woman.18 In effect, if he creates art he wishes to create, he is 
compelled to create art he does not wish to create. At Supreme Court 
oral argument in this case, Justice Ginsburg asked the gay couple’s 
lawyer, David Cole, what would happen if Phillips would design a 
wedding cake “that said: God bless the union of Ruth and Marty.” 
Cole replied: “[T]hen he would have to say God bless the union of 
Dave and Craig” because otherwise it would constitute 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.19 Thus, the 
Commission’s order was so broad as to require Phillips to include 
religious blessings on cakes celebrating same-sex marriages. 
After the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Phillips’s First 
Amendment claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses,20 the Supreme Court of the United Sates granted his 
petition for certiorari21 and held that the Commission’s actions 
“violated the Free Exercise Clause[] and its order must be set 
aside.”22 The purpose of this Article is to measure the impact of the 
Court’s decision on religious liberty and compelled speech claims 
going forward. Although the Court did not decide Phillips’s free 
speech claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop,23 the majority opinion24 and 
the concurring opinions contain a great deal of grist for the mill.25 
Moreover, the Court’s landmark compelled speech decision in 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra26 in June 
2018 seems to strongly support a future freedom of speech claim 
involving a wedding cake artist or other expressive vendor 
                                               
17  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 (citation omitted). 
18  Id. 
19  Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111). 
20  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272. 
21  85 U.S.L.W. 3593 (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-111). 
22  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.  
23  Id. at 1723–24. 
24  Id. at 1723–32. 
25  See id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
26  138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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compelled by law to create art or expression contrary to his or her 
conscience. 
This Article will explain and analyze the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence in Masterpiece Cakeshop. First, I will 
focus on the free speech issue in the case and the Court’s decision 
to avoid reaching the merits of that claim. Next, I will focus on the 
free exercise holding in the case with the goal of locating that 
holding within the Court’s pre-existing Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence. Finally, I will suggest that Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
perhaps the first step in a future restoration of constitutionally-
protected religious liberty. 
 
II.   THE COMPELLED SPEECH ISSUE IN MASTERPIECE 
CAKESHOP 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right of free 
speech includes the right not to be compelled to speak.27 Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn has captured the essence of the right not to speak as 
being based upon each individual’s conscience and commitment to 
the truth as he or she understands it. In an essay titled Live Not By 
Lies,28 Solzhenitsyn said, “let us refuse to say that which we do not 
think,” and went on to explain that an honest man worthy of the 
respect of both his children and his contemporaries “[w]ill not 
depict, foster or broadcast a single idea which he can only see is 
false or a distortion of the truth whether it be in painting, sculpture, 
photography, technical science, or music.”29 It is difficult to imagine 
any deprivation of liberty greater than being compelled by 
government to express an idea you believe to be not only untrue, but 
untrue to your understanding of God’s version of the truth.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that government may 
neither “compel the dissemination of its own preferred message . . . 
[n]or may it compel one private speaker to disseminate the message 
                                               
27  See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
28  Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Live Not By Lies (1974), in ORTHODOXY TODAY, 
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/SolhenitsynLies.php (last visited Jan. 2, 
2019). 
29  Id. (“Solzhenitsyn penned this essay in 1974 and it circulated among 
Moscow’s intellectuals at the time. It is dated Feb. 12, the same day that secret 
police broke into his apartment and arrested him. The next day he was exiled to 
West Germany. The essay is a call to moral courage and serves as light to all 
who value truth.”). 
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of another private speaker.”30 The landmark case recognizing the 
“no compelled speech” doctrine is West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette,31 the case in which the Court struck down 
mandatory flag salutes in public schools and explained its ruling in 
these unforgettable words of Justice Jackson: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit 
an exception, they do not now occur to us.32 
Although it was once possible to read Barnette as only 
prohibiting government from compelling affirmations of belief, 
such as the Pledge of Allegiance, it soon became clear that the 
compelled speech doctrine also forbids government from 
compelling the dissemination of unwanted expression. Consider, for 
example, Wooley v. Maynard,33 the famous case concerning the 
license plate motto “Live Free or Die,” in the state of New 
Hampshire. Mr. Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness who was 
conscientiously opposed to displaying that motto, covered it with 
                                               
30  Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)). 
31  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
32  Id. at 642. Justice Jackson further justified this decision protecting freedom of 
thought and expression from compelled unity of expression in these eloquent 
words: 
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so 
strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. 
Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from 
any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what 
doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall 
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such 
attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort 
from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber 
of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and 
dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, 
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian 
enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent 
soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory 
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the 
graveyard. 
Id. at 641. 
33  430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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tape on his license plate.34 The state of New Hampshire, somehow 
missing the irony of its actions, repeatedly prosecuted Maynard for 
covering up its libertarian credo.35 The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that New Hampshire may not require drivers in the state 
to display the state motto and announced the “no compelled speech” 
rule in clear and unqualified language. “We begin,” said the Wooley 
Court, “with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought 
protected by the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”36 In other 
words, the government may neither silence those who wish to speak, 
nor put words in the mouths of those who wish not to speak.37 A 
state’s interest in dissemination of its values does not “outweigh an 
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier 
for such message.”38 
The Supreme Court has also made clear that the compelled 
speech doctrine extends to the right of one private individual to 
refuse to foster or convey the ideas or expression of another private 
individual, even when the issue arises in the context of a public 
accommodations law. In Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,39 a case involving a sexual 
orientation discrimination complaint under a public 
accommodations law in the context of the Boston St. Patrick’s Day 
parade, the parade organizer was ordered by the state court to allow 
GLIB, a gay and lesbian group, “to march in the parade as a way to 
express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual individuals.”40 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous 
Court, held that the state court order violated the First Amendment 
and compared the idea of speaker autonomy—the right of the 
speaker to shape her “expression by speaking on one subject while 
remaining silent on another”—to that of a composer of a musical 
                                               
34  Mr. Maynard testified that the motto was contrary to his religious belief that, 
as a member of Jehovah’s Kingdom, he was the recipient of “everlasting life.” 
Id. at 707 n.2. It also violated his political belief “that life is more precious than 
freedom.” Id. 
35  New Hampshire law makes it a misdemeanor to cover or obscure the 
numbers or letters on a license plate. Id. at 707. Maynard was charged and 
convicted thrice, served fifteen days in jail, and finally sued for an injunction 
against further enforcement of the law. Id. at 708–09. 
36  Id. at 714. 
37  Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion further explained that “[t]he right to 
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
38  Id. at 717. 
39  515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
40  Id. at 561. 
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score who selects which notes to include and which to exclude.41 
Although state law had classified the parade as a place of public 
accommodation, the Court held that the Free Speech Clause applied 
because “once the expressive character of both the parade and the 
marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that 
the state court’s application of the statute had the effect of declaring 
the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.”42 Thus, 
ruled the Court in Hurley, the right of a speaker to decide what to 
say and what not to say lies “beyond the government’s power to 
control.”43 
In Obergefell v. Hodges,44 the case in which the Supreme 
Court created a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion contained powerful dictum designed to 
reassure people of faith that their views about marriage were not 
viewed by the Court as either unworthy or unacceptable: “Many 
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong” said Justice Kennedy in 
Obergefell, “reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable 
religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs 
are disparaged here.”45 In even further reassuring dictum, the 
Obergefell Court explicitly stated that “[t]he First Amendment 
ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper 
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling 
and so central to their lives and faiths.”46 Thus, unlike racist 
opposition to interracial marriage, which is indecent and 
dishonorable, the Obergefell majority took great pains to 
characterize religious opposition to same-sex marriage as decent and 
honorable.47  
                                               
41  Id. at 574. Justice Souter concluded that by compelling the parade organizer 
to permit GLIB to march in the parade, the State violated “the fundamental rule 
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to 
choose the content of his own message.” Id. at 573. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 575. For a decision protecting a for-profit corporation from being 
compelled to disseminate the message of other speakers, see Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(concluding a law requiring the appellant to distribute another person’s message 
in the “extra space” in its billing envelopes violates First Amendment). 
44  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
45  Id. at 2602. 
46  Id. at 2607. 
47  See Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement is Not Always Discrimination: On 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 123 (2018) (arguing that support for marriage as a conjugal union of 
husband and wife is essentially different from racist opposition to interracial 
marriage). 
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Now, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips presented 
Justice Kennedy and the Court with an opportunity to live up to that 
promise of respect and tolerance for his sincerely held religious 
beliefs about marriage. Since the law protecting speakers and artists 
from compelled speech was both clear and strong, the only obstacle 
in Phillips’s path was to convince the Court that his custom wedding 
cakes qualify as artistic expression. In other words, are his custom 
wedding cakes more like barbeque pork served by a restaurant48 or 
like a painting or sculpture created by an artist?49 One of the amicus 
briefs opposing Phillips in this case, written by First Amendment 
scholars who normally come out on the side of free speech, candidly 
admits that the government may not compel persons who create 
speech or artistic expression, such as painters, photographers, 
videographers, graphic designers, printers and singers, “to record, 
celebrate, or promote events they disapprove of, including same-sex 
weddings.”50 But somehow this brief concludes that free speech 
protection does not extend to wedding cake artists, such as Phillips. 
Cake is food—not speech—it argues.51  
Surely, a pizzeria cannot claim its pizzas or breadsticks 
involve First Amendment expression. A wedding vendor who rents 
chairs, tables and tablecloths is not engaging in an expressive 
enterprise. So much depends on the facts. At oral argument in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Solicitor General Francisco argued that Jack 
Phillips’s custom cakes “are essentially synonymous with a 
traditional sculpture except for the medium used.”52 In other words, 
Phillips is a sculptor who creates art from cake dough rather than 
clay or marble. He also paints using cake as his canvas. The Solicitor 
General suggested that a workable test with respect to a service that 
is part-art and part-utilitarian is to ask whether it is “predominantly 
                                               
48  For example, at oral argument Justice Breyer suggested that maybe the owner 
of a barbeque restaurant might believe “he had special barbeque” that should be 
protected as free speech. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 18. 
49  For example, the Court has unanimously concluded that the First Amendment 
“unquestionably” protects the abstract paintings of artists such as Jackson 
Pollack even though they do not convey a readily “articulable message.” Hurley 
v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
50  Brief for Am. Unity Fund, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
51  Id. at 5 (“A chef, however brilliant, cannot claim a Free Speech Clause right 
not to serve certain people at his restaurant, even if his dishes look stunning. The 
same is true for bakers, even ones who create beautiful cakes for use at 
weddings.”). This brief does concede, at least, that even cakes are protected as 
speech when they include “written or graphic messages.” Id. at 10. 
52  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 40. 
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art or predominantly utilitarian.”53 In other words, do people pay 
very high prices for “these highly sculpted” wedding cakes because 
they taste good and have nutritional value, or “because of their 
artistic qualities?”54 
As Phillips’s lawyers argued, his “wedding cakes are his 
artistic expression because he intends to, and does in fact, 
communicate through them.”55 His custom wedding cakes serve as 
the “iconic” centerpiece of wedding celebrations, and even those 
cakes that do not contain words clearly express that a wedding has 
occurred, that the couple’s union is a “marriage,” and that the 
marriage is a matter for celebration.56 Indeed, as the Colorado Court 
of Appeals described the facts in this case, when the same-sex 
couple entered his shop, they “requested that Phillips design and 
create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”57 
Although the majority opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop did 
not base its holding on the Free Speech Clause,58 it nevertheless 
contains some powerful dicta in support of Phillips’s right not to be 
compelled to create custom cakes with messages that offend his 
conscience. Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy observed that 
although the free speech issue in this case “is difficult, for few 
persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought 
of its creation as an exercise of protected speech,” Phillips’s claim 
“is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the 
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen 
                                               
53  Id. 
54  Id. See, e.g., Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(When a created item has both an expressive element and some non-expressive 
utilitarian purpose, “a court should then determine whether that non-expressive 
purpose is dominant or not.”). 
55  Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 19. 
56  Id. The argument continued: 
Phillips is as shielded by the Free Speech Clause as a modern 
painter or sculptor, and his greatest masterpieces—his custom 
wedding cakes—are just as worthy of constitutional protection 
as an abstract painting like Piet Mondrian’s Broadway Boogie 
Woogie, a modern sculpture like Alexander Calder’s 
Flamingo, or a temporary artistic structure like Christo and 
Jeanne-Claude’s Running Fence.  
Id. at 20–21. If an artist, such as Mondrian, painted a still life of one of Mr. 
Phillips’s cakes, it would be protected artistic expression. If a sculptor, such as 
Caldor, sculpted one of Mr. Phillips’s cakes out of clay, it would be protected 
artistic expression. Surely, the original cake painted and sculpted by Phillips is 
also protected artistic expression. 
57  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015) 
(emphasis added), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
58  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
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our understanding of their meaning.”59 Moreover, if a baker refuses 
“to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the 
marriage,” these additional details “might make a difference.”60 This 
free speech dicta in the case leaves behind some very helpful buried 
bones to be dug up and applied in a subsequent case involving cake 
artists or other expressive wedding vendors. 
Though the majority in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not reach 
the compelled speech issue in the case, a number of the concurring 
opinions did reach the issue. For example, Justice Thomas had a 
great deal to say about the issue in his concurring opinion joined by 
Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued that “[a]lthough the cake is 
eventually eaten, that is not its primary purpose. . . . The cake’s 
purpose is to mark the beginning of a new marriage and to celebrate 
the couple.”61 Thus, compelling Phillips to create a custom cake 
celebrating a same-sex wedding “clearly communicates a 
message—certainly more so than nude dancing.”62 Even in the case 
of a custom cake without words or symbolic designs, when 
Colorado compelled Phillips to make “custom wedding cakes for 
same-sex marriages,” it forced him “at the very least, [to] 
acknowledge that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and [to] 
suggest that they should be celebrated—the precise message he 
believes his faith forbids.”63 Justice Thomas concluded that “[t]he 
First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring Phillips to 
‘bear witness to [these] facts,’ or to ‘affir[m] . . . a belief with which 
[he] disagrees.’”64  
Justice Kagan took issue with Justice Thomas in her 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer. Kagan argued that 
Phillips’s refusal to bake the cake for the same-sex couple should 
not be viewed as refusing to bake a cake celebrating same-sex 
marriage, but rather as refusing to supply a product—a cake that is 
“simply a wedding cake” —and therefore “one that (like other 
standard wedding cakes) is suitable for use at same-sex and 
opposite-sex weddings alike.”65 Like a table, chair or napkin, a 
                                               
59  Id. at 1723. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
62  Id. (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991)). 
63  Id. at 1744. 
64  Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995)). 
65  Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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wedding cake is merely a utilitarian product, not an expressive 
celebration of any particular class of marriage.66  
But Justice Gorsuch was having none of this. In his 
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, he argued that it is 
“irrational” to conclude “that cakes with words convey a message 
but cakes without words do not.”67 Indeed, no one can “reasonably 
doubt that a wedding cake without words conveys a message.”68 
Without regard to the presence of words or “whatever the exact 
design,” a wedding cake “celebrates a wedding, and if the wedding 
cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a same-sex 
wedding.”69 The context of the custom wedding cake determines the 
message expressed by the cake artistry.  
A perfect example of how context matters in determining the 
message of a custom design can be found in Scardina v. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Inc. (“Masterpiece 2.0”).70 Decided only days after the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion protecting Mr. Phillips’s religious 
liberty in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Complainant in Masterpiece 
2.0, Autumn Scardina, requested a custom birthday cake with a pink 
interior and a blue exterior.71 The Complainant “explained that the 
design was a reflection of the fact that [she] transitioned from male-
to-female,” that she “had come out as transgender on [her] 
birthday,” and “that the cake was ‘to celebrate a sex-change from 
male to female.’”72 Obviously, the message Complainant asked Mr. 
Phillips to create through his cake artistry was much more than 
“happy birthday.” Rather, he was asked to design a cake expressing 
a celebration of male-to-female gender transition, something his 
deeply held religious beliefs would not allow him to do.73 Context 
matters in speech, and the context here alters the message from a 
celebration of a birthday to a celebration of a sex change.74 
                                               
66  Id. 
67  Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n June 28, 2018). 
71  Id. at 2. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 3. 
74  The Colorado Civil Rights Division ruled against Phillips and found that he 
violated Complainant’s right to “equal enjoyment of a place of public 
accommodation” by declining to create a custom cake celebrating her gender 
transition. Id. at 4. Masterpiece Cakeshop and Mr. Phillips responded to this 
ongoing threat to their religious liberty and freedom of speech by filing a federal 
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As in the case of a “birthday cake” expressing a message of 
celebration for a male-to-female gender transition, so also in the 
case of a “wedding cake” celebrating a same-sex marriage. The 
context in each case makes clear what is the message expressed by 
the custom cake. And when government compels a cake artist to 
create cakes expressing messages such as these contrary to his 
conscience, it violates the Free Speech Clause and the “no 
compelled speech” doctrine that resides at the core of freedom of 
speech. 
The Commission’s order in Masterpiece Cakeshop creates a 
classic unconstitutional condition.75 Colorado requires Phillips to 
choose between two constitutional rights: his right to create art he 
wishes to create, and his right to refrain from creating art he wishes 
not to create. He can have one constitutional right or the other, but 
not both. Indeed, in order to comply with the order in this case, 
Phillips has stopped creating wedding cakes for anyone.76 His 
artistic expression has been chilled—indeed, it has been frozen in its 
tracks—by order of the state of Colorado. The First Amendment 
does not permit government to put an artist to that odious choice. 
Although Masterpiece Cakeshop did not decide Phillips’s 
compelled speech claim, the Supreme Court did issue a strong 
opinion on the right of individuals not to be compelled “to speak a 
particular message” only a few weeks later in National Institute of 
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.77 In Becerra, the state of 
California required pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to provide 
certain “government-drafted” notices to their clients and in their 
advertisements.78 Remarkably, in his concurring opinion in Becerra, 
in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch joined, Justice 
Kennedy authored a powerful and eloquent manifesto against 
California’s attempt to “compel[] individuals to contradict their 
                                               
civil rights action against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and its 
Director, Aubrey Elenis, in the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado. Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074-
WYD-STV (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019). 
75  See Unconstitutional–Conditions Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (“[T]he government cannot force . . . [a person] to choose between 
two constitutionally protected rights.”). 
76  See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 28 (“[T]he Commission’s order has 
forced him to shut down his wedding business completely, slashing his income 
by 40%, forcing the loss of most of his staff, and silencing his artistic voice on 
marriage.”). 
77  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018). 
78  Id. 
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most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, 
ethical, or religious precepts.”79 Justice Kennedy expressed great 
concern that the compelled speech in Becerra amounted to 
viewpoint discrimination and described the danger as follows: 
This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious 
threat presented when government seeks to impose 
its own message in the place of individual speech, 
thought, and expression. For here the State requires 
primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the 
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions. 
This compels individuals to contradict their most 
deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic 
philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of 
these.80 
But what is even more noteworthy is Justice Kennedy’s response to 
the self-congratulatory statement by the California Legislature that 
“the Act was part of California’s legacy of ‘forward thinking.’”81 
Justice Kennedy observed that it is not “forward thinking” to compel 
ideological uniformity and continued: 
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First 
Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the 
history of authoritarian government as the Founders 
then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows 
how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their 
attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those 
lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the 
necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to 
come. Governments must not be allowed to force 
persons to express a message contrary to their 
deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures 
                                               
79  Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
80  Id. When government compels speech—whether it be pledging allegiance to 
the flag, expressing an ideological message such as “live free or die,” 
recognizing Irish–American gay pride, advertising the availability of subsidized 
abortion services, or creating a wedding cake celebrating same-sex marriage—
the compelled message almost always will be a viewpoint that the speaker 
wishes not to express. Id. 
81  Id. 
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freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils 
those liberties.82 
What Justice Kennedy said so forcefully in Becerra could 
have been said just as powerfully in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
Governments are indeed forbidden by the First Amendment from 
forcing individuals to say that which they “do not think.”83 And the 
decision in Becerra makes clear that the Court is committed to the 
“no compelled speech” doctrine of the First Amendment as a 
fundamental protection of speakers and artists from authoritarian 
government. 
 
III.   THE FREE EXERCISE RULING IN MASTERPIECE 
CAKESHOP 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith,84 a still-controversial decision from late in the 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that “the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground 
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’”85 Thus, the general rule of free exercise 
under Smith is “that government may prohibit what religion requires 
or require what religion prohibits.”86 However, the principal 
exception to that general rule, as the Court itself emphasized in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,87 is this:  
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral 
or not of general application must undergo the most 
                                               
82  Id. See also Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018) (striking down laws that require dissenting workers to subsidize 
unions). In Janus, the Court once again used powerful language describing the 
evil of speech compelled by government. Speaking for the majority, Justice 
Alito observed that compelled speech is even more damaging than speech 
restrictions, because “[w]hen speech is compelled” by government “individuals 
are coerced into betraying their convictions;” thus, “[f]orcing free and 
independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always 
demeaning.” Id. at 2464. 
83  Solzhenitsyn, supra note 28. 
84  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
85  Id. at 879. 
86  Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, 
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 
850 (2001). 
87  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the 
First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious 
practice must advance “‘interests of the highest 
order’” and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of 
those interests.88  
The free exercise issue before the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
then, was whether the general rule of Smith or the important 
exception set forth in Lukumi applied to the facts of Phillips’s 
religiously-motivated refusal to create a custom wedding cake 
celebrating a same-sex wedding.  
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court, in a strongly-worded 
but weakly-reasoned opinion, concluded that the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission did not act with “the religious neutrality that the 
Constitution requires”89 when applying the public accommodations 
law against Phillips, and that therefore its order requiring him to 
bake custom cakes for same-sex weddings “violated the Free 
Exercise Clause” and “must be set aside.”90 Although the Court 
made clear that as “a general rule” religious objections “of business 
owners and other actors in the economy and in society” are not 
protected “under a neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations law,”91 there are exceptional cases in which the 
Free Exercise Clause will protect religious objectors. For example, 
although the issue was not before the Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the majority observed in dictum that “a member of the 
clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds 
could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of 
his or her right to the free exercise of religion.”92 Apparently this is 
a categorical rule and would govern even if the law being enforced 
was neutral and generally applicable. Although the Court did not say 
so, an exception for the clergy is probably required by the so-called 
“ministerial exception” as announced by the Supreme Court in 
Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC.93 But by stating it as a categorical rule (even if in dictum) in 
                                               
88  Id. at 546 (citations omitted). 
89  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1724 (2018). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 1727. 
92  Id. 
93  Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 188 (2012) (stating the ministerial exception is designed to forbid 
 - 17 - 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court has brought much-needed clarity 
to at least one question about the intersection of gay rights laws and 
religious liberty. 
Although Phillips is not a member of the clergy, there was 
no question that the Commission’s order required him to act 
contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs. As Justice Kennedy 
explained, “[t]o Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex 
wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is 
contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.”94 However, since the 
public accommodations law is facially neutral and generally 
applicable, Phillips’s free exercise claim would prevail only if the 
law was applied against him in a manner that contravened “the 
religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.”95 Based upon the 
facts of this particular case, the Court held that Colorado violated 
the requirement of neutrality for two reasons.  
First, in the course of the Commission’s investigation of the 
charge of discrimination lodged against Phillips, certain 
commissioners made statements on the record that the Court 
interpreted as disparaging Phillips’s religious beliefs. For example, 
during the July 25, 2014, meeting of the Commission, one 
commissioner disparaged freedom of religion as justifying “all kinds 
of discrimination throughout history” including “slavery” and “the 
holocaust.”96 This commissioner went on to say that when religious 
freedom is employed “to justify discrimination” or “to hurt others,” 
it constitutes “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that 
people can use.”97 Justice Kennedy was deeply offended by these 
expressions of anti-religious bigotry “by an adjudicatory body 
deciding a particular case,”98 and concluded that “[t]his sentiment is 
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn 
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s 
antidiscrimination law.”99 
Second, and most important, the Commission applied a 
double standard when investigating discrimination complaints 
                                               
government action that “interferes with the internal governance of the church . . . 
[and] its beliefs”). 
94  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 1729 (citation omitted). 
97  Id.  
98  Id. at 1730. 
99  Id. at 1729. 
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against bakers who refused to create cakes that expressed messages 
of which they disapproved. Although the Colorado public 
accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
religious “creed” as well as “sexual orientation,”100 the Commission 
applied a more lenient standard to claims of religious discrimination 
than to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. On at least three 
different occasions, cake artists refused to bake cakes with religious 
“images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage.”101 Under 
the public accommodations law, the state of Colorado conceded that 
“[b]usinesses are entitled to reject orders for any number of reasons, 
including because they deem a particular product requested by a 
customer to be ‘offensive.’”102 The Commission applied this 
“offensive product” exception subjectively and on an ad hoc basis, 
apparently granting an exception when it agreed with the cake 
vendor and refusing an exception when it disagreed with the 
vendor.103 Thus, the Commission repeatedly allowed cake artists to 
refuse to create “offensive” cakes, even though the customer was in 
a protected class—religious “creed”—under the public 
accommodations law.104  
The three cases involving complaints of discrimination on 
the basis of religious “creed” involved the same customer, William 
Jack, who asked three different cake shops to bake cakes expressing 
his religious beliefs about same-sex marriage. Jack asked the three 
cake shops to create custom cakes in the shape of an open Bible with 
an image depicting two groomsmen covered by a red “x” and with 
Bible verses expressing disapproval of same-sex marriage.105 
Although William Jack was clearly a member of a protected class 
                                               
100  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017). 
101  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. In a civil rights lawsuit filed by 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Mr. Phillips against Colorado officials on August 14, 
2018, the Verified Complaint alleges that this “double standard . . . harshly 
punishes Phillips while exonerating other cake artists who similarly decline 
requests for cakes with messages they deem objectionable.” Complaint at 3, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074-WYD-STV (D. Colo. 
Jan. 4, 2019). 
102  Brief for Respondent at 52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-
111). 
103  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31 (suggesting that these 
decisions were improperly based on “the government’s own assessment of 
offensiveness”). 
104  Id. at 1728–30. 
105  Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n 
Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X 
(Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. 
P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n Mar. 24, 2015). 
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based upon his religious creed, the Colorado Civil Rights Division 
determined that the refusal to create cakes was not based upon that 
protected status, but rather because the cake artists deemed the 
requested words and images to be “discriminatory,”106 “hateful,”107 
or “derogatory.”108 However, when Phillips made exactly the same 
argument—that he was willing to sell any other baked goods to gay 
customers and that his refusal to bake wedding cakes for same-sex 
weddings was not based upon the sexual identity of his customers 
but rather his religious beliefs about the definition of marriage—
Colorado ruled against him. As Justice Kennedy put it, “[i]n short, 
the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’s religious objection did 
not accord with its treatment of these other objections.”109 Thus, this 
unequal treatment of Phillips “violated the State’s duty under the 
First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a 
religion or religious viewpoint.”110 The Free Exercise Clause 
requires neutral and generally applicable laws and treatment, and 
“bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of 
religion.”111 The Court concluded that Colorado’s “disparate 
consideration of Phillips’s case compared to the cases of the other 
bakers” violated the Free Exercise Clause, and thus the cease and 
desist order issued against Phillips “must be set aside.”112 
Although the Court’s “neutrality” analysis in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop was seriously under-reasoned, it is nevertheless an 
important contribution to religious liberty jurisprudence because it 
clearly recognizes that “[e]xemptions for secular interests without 
exemptions for religious practice reflect a hostile indifference to 
religion.”113 Moreover, the Court’s laser-beam focus on Colorado’s 
ad hoc process for making subjective evaluations of the 
“offensiveness” of a cake’s message as a legitimate reason for a 
vendor’s refusal to create a cake for a member of a protected class114 
appears to be an important application of a rule, recognized in both 
Smith and Lukumi: If the state has in place a system for 
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
                                               
106  Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X. 
107  Le Bakery Sensual, Charge No. P20140070X. 
108  Gateaux, Charge No. P20140071X. 
109  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
110  Id. at 1731. 
111  Id. (citation omitted). 
112  Id. at 1732. 
113  Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
50. 
114  See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
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relevant conduct,”115 and if the government grants individualized 
exemptions “from its law for secular reasons, then it must grant 
comparable exemptions for religious reasons.”116  
 Religious liberty is particularly vulnerable under such a 
subjective ad hoc process because individualized decision-making 
by government “provides ample opportunity for discrimination 
against religion in general or unpopular faiths in particular.”117 The 
risk is great that government officials will not “apply[] a consistent 
legal rule” when exercising such unfettered discretion.118 Thus, as 
Justice Gorsuch explained,  
 
the Commission’s decisions simply reduce to this: it 
presumed that Mr. Phillip[s] harbored an intent to 
discriminate against a protected class in light of the 
foreseeable effects of his conduct, but it declined to 
presume the same intent in Mr. Jack’s case even 
though the effects of the bakers’ conduct were just as 
foreseeable.119  
 
In other words, in applying its ad hoc process for making subjective 
evaluations of the “offensiveness” of a cake’s message as a 
legitimate reason for a vendor’s refusal to create a cake for a 
member of a protected class, the Commission was guilty of applying 
“a more generous legal test to secular objections than religious 
ones.”120 Under the Free Exercise Clause, this failure of neutral 
treatment requires the officials to justify their double standard under 
strict scrutiny and the compelling interest test.121 Moreover, and 
once again in the words of Justice Gorsuch, 
 
[b]ut it is also true that no bureaucratic judgment 
condemning a sincerely held religious belief as 
“irrational” or “offensive” will ever survive strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment. In this country, 
the place of secular officials isn’t to sit in judgment 
                                               
115  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
116  See Laycock, supra note 113. 
117  Id. at 48. 
118  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1736 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 1737. 
121  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 
(1993) (stating that the compelling interest test applies when government applies 
an individualized exemption process but refuses to recognize religious claims 
for exemption). See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized 
Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 
NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1187 (2005). 
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of religious beliefs, but only to protect their free 
exercise.122 
 
 Going forward, free exercise claims by wedding vendors 
should focus carefully on subjective tests employed by civil rights 
commissions when determining whether a vendor has engaged in 
unlawful discrimination or has lawfully declined to supply an 
“offensive” product or a cake with an “offensive” message. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that when government 
officials allow individualized secular exemptions from a regulatory 
standard, it must also extend protection to religious exemption 
claims. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,123 Sherbert’s religious 
liberty was unequally burdened by South Carolina’s individualized 
unemployment compensation process. Thus, the South Carolina law 
was neither neutral nor generally applicable because an applicant 
was ineligible for unemployment benefits only if the Employment 
Security Commission made an ad hoc finding that he or she had 
failed without “good cause” to accept “suitable work.”124 Since the 
Commission was empowered to grant “good cause” or “suitability” 
exemptions to those who had refused work for certain secular 
reasons—such as an applicant’s physical fitness, prior earnings, and 
prospects for securing local work in his or her customary 
occupation—but refused to grant a similar exemption to Sherbert 
when she declined employment for religious reasons, the law was 
tainted by a discretionary process and, therefore, was not neutral and 
generally applicable.125 
 
 Similarly, in Lukumi the Court discussed a Florida animal 
cruelty law that punished anyone who killed any animal 
“unnecessarily.”126 Although this law appeared on its face to be both 
neutral and generally applicable, the Court viewed it as representing 
“a system of ‘individualized governmental assessment of the 
reasons for the relevant conduct,’” because the law required 
government officials to decide which animal killings were 
“necessary” and which were “unnecessary” when enforcing the 
ordinance.127 The Court in Lukumi stated that the compelling interest 
test applies whenever a religious-accommodation claim is denied 
                                               
122  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1737 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
123  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
124  Id. at 400–01. 
125  See id. at 400 n.3 (describing the process for granting “good cause” and 
“suitability” exemptions). 
126  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537. 
127  Id. (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
884 (1990)). Although government officials considered the killing of animals for 
religious sacrifice as unnecessary, they considered hunting and many other 
secular killings as necessary. Id. 
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under “circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a 
general requirement are available.”128 
 
 Thus, as Professor Douglas Laycock explained in an article 
published before Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided:  
 
A Christian activist named William Jack, who is not 
a party to the litigation, smoked out the state of 
Colorado and forced it to make explicit what is 
usually left to speculation: the refusal to protect 
conscientious objectors in these cases is 
discriminatory and one sided. Colorado protects 
conscientious objectors who support gay rights or 
marriage equality, but it does not protect 
conscientious objectors who oppose marriage 
equality. Because the law is not applied equally, it is 
not neutral and generally applicable, and it is 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Free 
Exercise Clause.129  
 
The subjective process the Colorado Commission applied when 
deciding whether a conscientious objector has lawfully declined to 
create a product because of its offensive message is categorically 
non-neutral. The answer to the question whether it is lawful to reject 
a product with an offensive message “cannot depend on whether the 
state, or the court, agrees with the message.”130 An individualized 
and subjective process for determining who is exempt from a 
regulatory burden is not a religiously-neutral process, and therefore, 
strict scrutiny applies under Lukumi when a religious conscientious 
objector is denied an exemption.131 
 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Public accommodations laws are being weaponized by 
supporters of same-sex marriage to drive religious conscientious 
objectors out of business and deprive them of their livelihoods. For 
example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins 
attempted to use Colorado law not only to demand “the right to live 
their own lives by their own values, but also the right to force 
religious objectors to assist them in doing so.”132 The issue was not 
                                               
128  Id. at 537. See generally Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized 
Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts and Religious Liberty, supra 
note 121, at 1178–1203. 
129  Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
49, 54–55 (2018) (citations omitted). 
130  Id. at 57. 
131  See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
132  Laycock, supra note 1, at 879–80. 
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whether they could obtain a custom wedding cake in the Denver 
metropolitan marketplace, but whether Jack Phillips must set aside 
his sincerely held religious beliefs to design a wedding cake 
celebrating their same-sex wedding.133 
 
 This disdain for religious liberty is not accidental; it is a 
mainstream opinion among progressive supporters of same-sex 
marriage and gay rights.134 In 2013, for example, when Mr. 
Phillips’s home state of Colorado passed a civil-union bill covering 
same-sex relationships without meaningful protection for religious 
liberty, the bill’s sponsor mocked and delegitimized religious liberty 
as follows:  
 
So, what to say to those who say religion requires 
them to discriminate. I’ll tell you what I’d say. Get 
thee to a nunnery and live there then. Go live a 
monastic life away from modern society, away from 
people you can’t see as equal to yourself, away from 
the stream of commerce where you may have to 
serve them.135 
 
In other words, religious believers must choose between their 
religious beliefs and their livelihoods. If your religion is not 
consistent with participating in (and even celebrating) same-sex 
relationships, you should close down your business and “get thee to 
a nunnery.”136  
 
 But religious liberty is not just a trivial consideration that can 
be cast aside whenever it gets in the way of the policy preferences 
of a majority. Free speech and religious liberty are inalienable civil 
rights, fundamental freedoms protected explicitly by the Bill of 
Rights. And this is where Masterpiece Cakeshop takes the stage to 
remind us that the First Amendment still exists and continues to 
protect free speech and religious liberty against restrictions imposed 
by majoritarian laws. Jack Phillips did not fight for a right to 
“discriminate” against gays and lesbians; he serves all customers, 
including gays and lesbians. Like Solzhenitsyn, he fought for the 
right to refrain from saying that which he does not think, that which 
he does not believe reflects God’s truth about what marriage is and 
what it is not.137 
 
                                               
133  Id. at 877 (“All those things are readily available in the market place in most 
of the country. The issue is whether the religious conscientious objector must be 
the one who provides these things.”).  
134  See id. at 870. 
135  Id. at 871. 
136  Id. 
137  See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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 Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not base its holding on the Free Speech 
Clause, it contains powerful dicta that may be helpful in future 
compelled speech cases involving wedding vendors whose services 
are expressive.138 Moreover, in Becerra the Court issued a very 
strong opinion striking down laws requiring pro-life crisis 
pregnancy centers “to speak a particular message.”139 And Justice 
Kennedy wrote a powerful concurring opinion in Becerra 
denouncing attempts by “authoritarian government” to compel 
speech and ideological uniformity.140 Indeed, 2018 was a historic 
year for the Free Speech Clause and the “no compelled speech” 
doctrine. The next cake artistry case to reach the Court will have a 
much easier path to protection under the Free Speech Clause 
because of the decisions in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Becerra, and 
Janus.141 
 
 The Court did rule in favor of Mr. Phillips’s free exercise 
claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop, and, although Justice Kennedy's 
majority opinion was somewhat under-reasoned, it nevertheless 
paves a significant path for religious liberty claims going forward. 
The Court held that Colorado’s enforcement of its public 
accommodations law against Phillips contravened “the religious 
neutrality that the Constitution requires”142 for two reasons. First, 
neutrality was compromised because the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission made a number of bigoted statements disparaging 
Phillips’s religious beliefs in particular and religious freedom in 
general.143  
 
 Second, and most important for future free exercise cases, 
the Court held that the requirement of neutrality was not satisfied 
because the Commission applied a double standard when 
investigating discrimination complaints.144 This was so because the 
Commission applied a more generous standard to secular bakers 
who objected to a cake’s message than to religious bakers asserting 
conscientious objections. Because this process for evaluating the 
“offensive product” exemption from Colorado’s public 
accommodations law was an individualized and subjective one, 
                                               
138  See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. Moreover, Justice Thomas 
and Justice Gorsuch authored thoughtful and powerful concurring opinions in 
support of Phillips’s free speech rights. See supra notes 61–69 and 
accompanying text. 
139  See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
140  See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
141  See supra text accompanying note 82 (providing a brief discussion of 
Janus). 
142  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1724 (2018). 
143  See supra text accompanying notes 96–99. 
144  See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
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strict scrutiny applies when equal exemptions are not extended to 
religious conscientious objectors. In short, an individualized and 
subjective process for determining who is exempt from a regulatory 
burden is not a religiously-neutral process, and therefore triggers 
strict scrutiny under Lukumi when a religious conscientious objector 
is denied an exemption.145 In future cases involving religious 
wedding-vendors charged with violating public accommodations 
laws, counsel would be wise to look long and hard at the argument 
that an individualized exemption is likely to fail the test of neutrality 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 
  
 In conclusion, pragmatists may ask why does a man like Jack 
Phillips insist on his right not to create a custom cake celebrating a 
same-sex wedding? Why not just give in and bake the cake rather 
than put your business and livelihood at risk under the public 
accommodations law? Perhaps the answer to this question is found 
in Robert Bolt’s wonderful play about Sir Thomas More, A Man For 
All Seasons.146  
 
 In one powerful scene from the play, More’s friends are 
encouraging him to obey the King’s command and sign a statement 
recognizing the lawfulness of the King’s divorce and remarriage. 
Just give in, Thomas, just give in, they beg. And More says this: 
“Some men think the Earth is round, others think it is flat; it is a 
matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the King’s command 
make it round? And if it is round, will the King’s command flatten 
it? No, I will not sign.”147 Like Solzhenitsyn, More’s conscience 
required him to speak the truth—and only the truth—as he best 
understood it. He must refuse to say that which he does not think, 
that which he does not believe reflects the truth of what marriage is 
in the eyes of God.  
 
 Like More, Jack Phillips is a man of deep and sincere 
conscience. His conscience will not permit him to use his artistry to 
celebrate an event that is not consistent with his understanding of 
God’s truth. He should not be treated like an outlaw by his 
government.  
                                               
145  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
146  ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN TWO ACTS (Random 
House 1990) (1960).  
147  Id. at 133.  
